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The Trealy That Made
America a World Power
I
, jl
The Treaty of Paris,
signed 200 years ago
this month, recognized
the United States as a




By William F. Swindler
THE extended bicentennial period from
1976 to 1987-89 is highlighted by at least
two developments. The first occurred
on March I, 1781, when the first instru-
ment of national government, the Arti-
cles of Confederation, went into effect.
(See "Our First Constitution: The Arti-
cles of Confederation," ABA Journal,
February 1981, page 166.) The second
was the Treaty of Paris signed Sept. 3,
1783, which gave the formal sanction of
international law to the Declaration of
Independence.
The treaty of 1783 was an essential
step toward the Constitution itself. In
enrolling the fledgling American govern-
ment into the society of nations, the
treaty formally vested the United States
under the Articles of Confederation with
all the responsibilities that those nations
assumed and expected of one another.
Whether the tentative republic would be
capable of discharging these respon-
sibilities was, at the time, an open ques-
tion.
Already the shaky internal authority
nominally established by the articles
was being subjected to severe strains as
the necessities of defense against hostile
armies now were removed. The equally
pressing necessities of establishing a
complete organization of state govern-
ments to replace the former colonial
governments-a matter dealt with ad
hoc or provisionally since Lexington and
Concord-demanded virtually all of the
energies of the Founding Fathers.
The French maneuver
A preliminary treaty had been con-
cluded in Paris the previous November
and ratified by Congress on April 15,
1783. These articles, as their text made
clear, were "to be inserted in, and to
constitute, the treaty of peace," but the
formal instrument was not to be con-
cluded "until terms . . . shall be agreed
upon between Great Britain and
France."
The maneuverings for advantage of
the French negotiators, particularly the
minister of state, le comte de Ver-
gennes, had dragged on for almost a
year. The American representatives in
Paris-John Adams, Benjamin Franklin,
John Jay and Henry Laurens-had diffi-
culties enough with their British coun-
terparts, who finally left details to a
single commissioner, Robert Oswald.
Laurens was a prisoner in the Tower of
London when peace conversations
began, having been captured on the high
seas en route to Holland in 1780. He
arrived in Paris only two days before the
preliminary articles were agreed to.
Meet the Americans
The four American negotiators were
perhaps the most experienced of all their
countrymen in foreign affairs.
In 1778 Adams arrived in France with
his 10-year-old son, John Quincy, as
commissioner to the Bourbon court, on
the heels of French diplomatic recogni-
Artist Chuck Slack visualizes Benjamin
Franklin, John Jay, Henry Laurens and
John Adams, who represented the
incipient United States of America in
negotiating the Treaty of Paris.
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tion of the independence of the Amer-
ican states. He took up residence in the
same house with Benjamin Franklin,
who had spent a number of years in
England as a representative of Pennsyl-
vania and several other colonies and
who had held a royal commission as
postmaster general for North America.
Franklin had gone to Paris as one of
the members of the wartime commission
of the Continental Congress, and his
enjoyment of the court life there, where
he was a popular favorite of many of the
men in high office and an even greater
favorite of the women of the court,
made him a less than critical observer of
French intrigue. He may have influ-
enced Adams unduly, before the future
second president learned enough to
make his own judgments. In any case,
Adams had learned enough by the clos-
ing years of the war to keep some of his
judgments to himself, as in opening the
prolonged negotiations for a Dutch com-
mercial treaty.
John Jay, the former chief justice of
New York and future chief justice of the
United States, had served in 1779 as a
member of a secret committee of corre-
spondence, appointed by the Continen-
tal Congress to contact potential Eur-
opean allies. The following year he had
been sent to Spain in the hope of gaining
diplomatic recognition. The best Jay
was able to do was to secure some
secret supply of materiel and money for
the American government.
Laurens, who like Franklin had spent
much of his youth as a colonial in
England, was a Charleston merchant
whose export-import business had
developed many European commercial
contacts. His diplomatic mission to Hol-
land, to assist Adams in trying for a
Dutch loan, had resulted in his capture
on the high seas by the British and a
British declaration of war against the
Netherlands.
It wasn't the first
Although the definitive treaty, when
finally ratified in London and in the
United States, formally removed all
legal question of the legitimacy of the
American claims to sovereignty, it was
not the only international agreement
negotiated by the Continental Congress.
The military alliance with France and
the concurrent treaty of commerce both
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came in 1778. The commercial treaty
with the Netherlands came in 1782, and
another with Sweden in 1783 before the
settlement in Paris.
Congress also would conclude several
treaties with Indian nations and other
continental powers before it was suc-
ceeded by the government created by
the Constitution. It is significant that
Article VI of that instrument- "This
Constitution, and the laws of the United
States which shall be made in pursuance
thereof; and all treaties made, or which'
shall be made, under the authority of the
United States, shall be the supreme law
of the land"-recognized and continued
in force these agreements made by the
Continental Congress.
International politicking
Ending the state of war was a compli-
The Gallic imagination
would not overlook





cated business. It involved directly or
indirectly five different countries. The
United States and Great Britain were
the principal high contracting parties.
But France-the Gallic imagination
would not overlook the fact that 1783
marked the 20th anniversary of another
peace treaty signed in Paris that
deprived her of her major North Amer-
ican possessions in Canada at the end of
the French and Indian War-had sepa-
rate matters to settle with Britain.
France intended to maintain a sphere of
influence in the newly independent
United States and see to it that postwar
trade agreements did not freeze her out
of commercial advantages as the Amer-
ican resources were developed.
French imperial politics had led her to
an alliance with Spain, with France hav-
ing promised assistance in recovering
Florida from the British, and perhaps
Gibraltar as well. Finally, there was the
Netherlands, which had gone to war
with England in 1780 for its unneutral
American sympathies and its commer-
cial treaty with the United States in
1782. An Anglo-Dutch preliminary
treaty of peace was signed in Paris on
Sept. 2, the day before the definitive
treaty with the other powers.
The new American nation was thus
getting its feet wet in international poli-
tics as well as international law. The
Anglo-American preliminary agreement
of 1782, in fact, had contained a secret
provision that if Florida remained in
British hands, the southern border of the
independent United States would be at
the latitude of present-day Vicksburg.
Although this provision was not
included in the 1783 treaty because
Spain got Florida as a trade-off for aban-
doning its efforts to get Gibraltar, this
essentially converted the Anglo-His-
panic disputes into a foreign relations
problem between Spain and the new
nation, not to be settled fully until 1819
when the United States acquired Florida
from Spain by treaty.
There were other important issues left
unsettled by the 1783 instrument. Most
pressing was the question of pre-Revolu-
tionary debts owed British creditors by
erstwhile colonials, which at last was
disposed of by Jay's Treaty of 1795. In
the same year Pinckney's Treaty (the
Treaty of San Lorenzo) settled other
Spanish questions, such as the status of
"West Florida" (the Gulf Coast near
New Orleans) and the right of free navi-
gation on the Mississippi.
Questions of quorum
Ratification of the Treaty of Paris was
delayed for a number of months, largely
because of the slowness of trans-Atlan-
tic communications and the fact that
most delegates to the Continental Con-
gress had gone home indefinitely to par-
ticipate in state affairs. On Jan. 3, 1784,
a committee including Jefferson,
Elbridge Gerry and others reported the
lack of a quorum. Only seven of the 13
states were represented and "these dif-
fer in opinion." Some pointed to the
stipulation in the Articles of Con-
federation that nine states were to be
represented when Congress ratified a
treaty, while others argued that since
nine had been present the previous win-
ter when the provisional treaty had been
ratified and had instructed the American
commission to sign the final version,
seven now was a sufficient quorum.
The strict constructionists won out,
however, and it was resolved that "the
states now present in Congress do
declare their approbation . . . so far as
they have power" and proposed that the
commissioners seek an extension of
the deadline for ratification until at least
nine states could be represented.
Things cleared up more quickly than
expected, however. On Jan. 14 a quorum
of nine had been mustered, and final
ratification was forwarded to Paris on
the heels of the earlier material. Con-
gress then resumed its record of spo-
radic attendance of delegates, with a kind
of executive committee of the states set
up to perform caretaker functions. This
committee on Aug. 2, 1784, received offi-
cial notice from Franklin, now minister
plenipotentiary to the Court of Versailles,
that the final formal exchange of certified
copies of ratification had been made the
previous May 12.
A grandiloquent preamble
The treaty was a concise general
instrument of 10 articles, although its
preamble was grandiloquent enough,
describing the parties of the first and
second parts, respectively, as "the most
serene and most potent prince George
the Third, King of Great-Britain, France
and Ireland, defender of the faith, duke
of Brunswick and Lunenburg, arch-trea-
surer and prince elector of the Holy
Roman empire," and, in plain republican
terms, the United States of America.
The first two articles recognized the
independence of each of the 13 states by
name and set out a detailed geographic
definition of the boundaries of the new
nation, while the third professed to
ensure the right of American fishing off
the Newfoundland Banks. The seventh
made the 1781 cease-fire permanent and
stipulated that remaining British troops
were to be withdrawn from points within
the territory defined in Article 2. The
eighth article proclaimed freedom of
navigation on the Mississippi to
nationals of both countries, the ninth
provided for mutual restitutions and
assurances and the 10th set out the sched-
ule for ratification.
Simplistic isn't good
The seedbed for subsequent diplo-
matic and legal problems was the
fourth, fifth and sixth articles. The
fourth simply (indeed, all too simply)
states: "It is agreed that creditors on
either side shall meet with no lawful
impediment to the recovery of the full
value in sterling money of all bona fide
debts heretofore contracted." Article 5
committed Congress to "earnestly rec-
ommend" to the individual states that
confiscated British property be
restored, and Article 6 pledged that no
future confiscations would be made.
These prepared the way for the early
constitutional cases of Ware v. Hylton, 3
Dall. 199, in 1796 and, somewhat indi-
rectly, Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, I
Wheat. 304 (1816). John Marshall as an
attorney lost his only case before the
John Marshall
Supreme Court when he represented
Daniel Hylton, a Richmond merchant
whose name also figured in the first
major tax decision, Hylton v. United
States, 3 Dall. 171 (1796), and as chiefjus-
tice he recused himself in the original
appeal of the Hunter case when it came up
as Fairfax's Devisee F. Hunter's Lessee.
By then, after prolonged negotiations, a
special debts claims commission finally
had settled the creditors' rights.
The essential difficulty in discharging
the undertaking in Article 4 arose from
the practice of several of the Revolution-
ary state governments of sequestering
the debts owed to overseas creditors,
sometimes offsetting them with liqui-
dated property seized from departed
loyalists or other enemy aliens and
sometimes in effect simply extinguishing
them by an assumed sovereign preroga-
tive. In Virginia, for example, the "inter-
regnum" government created a state
claims office, to which local debtors
brought their written evidence of lia-
bilities. The state office issued certifi-
cates of discharge and gathered in the
documents presented, interposing the
doctrine of sovereign immunity.
Postwar suits for recovery of these
prewar debts were brought in the new
state courts when these eventually
opened, and there the immunity of the
state was entered as a plea in bar. So
long as the only available forum re-
mained in these states, creditors were
unable to obtain judgments against
either the original debtors or the state.
Marshall and several other lawyers
received so much business in defending
against the creditors that they had a
standardized, printed form to be filled in
when entering the defense plea.
Constitution to the rescue
Thus matters stood until the Constitu-
tion's Article III went into effect and
created a system of federal courts in
which a new action could be initiated.
Under the treaty clause of Article VI,
Hylton was again made defendant in a
suit brought by representatives of the
assignee of the original creditor, now
long deceased. The Supreme Court of
the United States held that Article 4 of
the Treaty of Paris retroactively nul-
lified the Virginia legislation, invalidated
token payments made by the original
debtors in return for discharge, revived
the debt and vested a right of recovery
in the claimants notwithstanding any
contrary state law.
The frustration of the fourth (and fifth
and sixth) articles of the treaty in the
state courts had led to the unique lan-
guage of Article VI of the Constitution,
which was first construed in the Hylton
case. Although the Articles of Con-
federation vested sovereign authority in
Congress to negotiate treaties, the en-
forcement of specific treaty undertak-
ings depended on the state courts in the
absence of a national court system. Brit
ish creditors, unsuccessful in the state
courts. complained to John Jay, Amer-
ican minister of foreign affairs under the
Articles of Confederation, who finally
urged Congress in 1786 to send the usual
precatory communication to the states.
in this case urging them to repeal all
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laws repugnant to the treaty. This com-
munication was issued in April 1787, on
the very eve of the Philadelphia Con-
vention. Some states complied; others
did not. Because of this, the draftsmen
of the Constitution transferred jurisdic-
tion of subject matter of "all treaties
[already] made" to the national govern-
ment in the supremacy clause.
Treaty clause conceptualized
The experience with the 1783 treaty,
therefore, directly affected the con-
ceptual language of the Constitution.
Treaties under certain circumstances
not only could be self-executing when
ratified by the Senate but become the
rule of decision in municipal law. The
Supreme Court on two important occa-
sions recognized this consequence of the
language in Article VI.
Chief Justice Marshall in 1829 in Fos-
ter v. Neilson, 2 Pet. 253. made the first
interpretation:
"A treaty is, in its nature, a contract
between two nations, not a legislative
act. It does not generally effect, of itself,
the object to be accomplished; espec-
ially, so far as its operation is infrater-
ritorial [sic]; but is carried into
execution by the sovereign power of the
respective parties to the instrument. In
the United States, a different principle is
established. Our Constitution declares a
treaty to be the law of the land. It is,
consequently, to be regarded in courts of
justice as equivalent to an act of the leg-
islature, whenever it operates of itself,
without the aid of any legislative provi-
sion. But when the terms of the stipula-
tion import a contract-when either of
the parties engages to perform a particu-
lar act, the treaty addresses itself to the
political, not the judicial, department;
and the legislature must execute the con-
tract before it can become a rule for the
court."
A variant on this was given in 1884 by
Justice Samuel F. Miller in the Head
Money Cases, 112 U.S. 589, when he
declared: "A treaty is primarily a com-
pact between independent nations ...
But [it] may also contain provisions
which confer certain rights upon the cit-
izens or subjects of one of the nations
residing in the territorial limits of the
other, which partake of the nature of
municipal law, and which are capable of
enforcement as between private parties
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in the courts of that country."
Treaties and migratory birds
While most treaties ratified by the
Senate, even with what appear to be
self-executing provisions, then are
implemented by enacting domestic stat-
utes, treaties in effect do introduce inter-
national law as a source of national
power complementary to the other
powers vested by the Constitution. The
somewhat foirtuitous result of the expe-
rience with the pre-Article VI Treaty of
Paris has provided the United States in
its subsequent history with an option for
implementing national policy, which on
appropriate occasions has been exer-
cised.
The best-known instance is the 1916
Migratory Bird Treaty between the
United States and Great Britain, acting
on behalf of Canada. Two years after the
treaty's ratification, Congress passed an
implementing act authorizing the De-
partment of Agriculture to issue appro-
priate regulations to carry out the treaty
obligations to protect migratory birds in
passage between Canada and the Amer-
ican states. Two years later Missouri
sought a bill in equity to enjoin federal
game wardens from acting under the
regulations, alleging that the treaty
infringed reserved state powers under
the 10th Amendment.
In Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416
(1920), Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes,
speaking for a seven-two majority of the
Supreme Court, upheld the district
court's dismissal of the petition, declar-
ing:
"Acts of Congress are the supreme
law of the land only when made in pur-
suance of the Constitution, while
treaties are declared to be so when made
under the authority of the United
States. . . .We do not mean to imply
that there are no qualifications to the
treaty-making power; but they must be
ascertained in a different way. It is
obvious that there may be matters of the
sharpest exigency for the national well-
being that an act of Congress could not
deal with but that a treaty followed by
such an act could, and it is not lightly to
be assumed that, in matters requiring
national action, 'a power which must
belong to and somewhere reside in every
civilized government' is not to be
found ...
"Here a national interest of very
nearly the first magnitude is involved. It
can be protected only by national action
in concert with that of another national
power. The subject matter is only tran-
sitorily within the state and has no per-
manent habitat there. But for the treaty
and the statute there soon might be no
birds for any powers to deal with. We
see nothing in the Constitution that
compels the government to sit by
while .. .the protectors of our forests
and our crops are destroyed.
Putting a gloss on Holmes
While later Congresses and Supreme
Courts have glossed Holmes' doctrine
with assurances that the treaty power
may not be invoked in contravention of
any explicit limitation contained in the
Constitution itself, the ill-conceived
effort to amend Article VI through the
so-called Bricker proposal of the 1950s
was defeated. The fact is that treaty
provisions, whether self-executing or
executory and although deriving original
validity from international rather than
constitutional law, are enforceable only
in terms of their consonance with the
Constitution. This is one of the ultimate
contributions of the 200-year-old Treaty
of Paris. -imd
(William F. Swindler is John Marshall
professor of law emeritus at the Col-
lege of William and Mary. He is com-
pleting a manuscript on the Continen-
tat Congress and the events of the
Revolution and the Articles of Con-
federation leading to the Constitutional
Convention.)
